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The paper aims to investigate on empirical and theoretical grounds the Brazilian exchange rate dynamics under floating 
exchange rates. The empirical analysis examines the short and long run behavior of exchange rate, interest rate 
(domestic and foreign) and country risk using econometric techniques such as variance decomposition, Granger 
causality, cointegration tests, error correction models, and a GARCH model to estimate the exchange rate volatility. The 
empirical findings suggest that one can argue in favor of a certain degree of endogeneity of the exchange rate and that 
flexible rates have not been able to insulate the Brazilian economy in the same patterns predicted by the literature due to 
its own specificities (managed floating with the use of international reserves and domestic interest rates set according to 
inflation target) and to externally determined variables such as the country risk. Another important outcome is the lack 
of a closer association of domestic and foreign interest rates since the new exchange regime has been adopted. That is, 
from January 1999 to May 2004, the US monetary policy has no significant impact on the Brazilian exchange rate 
dynamics, which has been essentially endogenous primarily when we consider the fiscal dominance expressed by the 
probability of default.  
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Resumo 
O artigo pretende investigar, sob o ponto de vista empírico e teórico, a dinâmica da taxa de câmbio no Brasil, sob 
regime de câmbio flutuante. A análise empírica examina o comportamento de curto e longo prazo da taxa de câmbio, 
dos juros (domésticos e externos) e do risco-país através de técnicas econométricas como decomposição de variância, 
causalidade de Granger, testes de cointegração, modelos de correção de erro, e um modelo GARCH para estimar a 
volatilidade da taxa de câmbio. Os resultados empíricos sugerem que se pode argumentar a favor da ocorrência de um 
certo grau de endogeneidade da taxa de câmbio e que a flutuação cambial não tem isolado a economia brasileira de 
choques da mesma maneira prevista pela literatura em função de suas próprias especificidades (flutuação administrada 
com o uso de reservas internacionais e juros guiado de acordo com a meta inflacionária) e do comportamento de 
variáveis externas como o risco-país. Outro importante resultado é a ausência de uma associação entre juros doméstico 
e externo a partir da implementação do novo regime cambial.  Isto é, de Janeiro de 1999 a Maio de 2004, a política 
monetária norte-americana não afetou o comportamento da taxa de câmbio no Brasil, uma vez que este foi um 
fenômeno essencialmente endógeno, principalmente quando se considera a dominância fiscal expressa pela 
probabilidade de default.  
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Introduction 
 
Since 1999 Brazil has undergone a regime switch moving towards a floating exchange rate regime 
after an intensive financial crisis. From a pegged regime adopted during 1994-1998 the economy 
inherited balance of payments imbalance and a high public debt as a result of high interest rate in 
order to defend the exchange parity. The transition to the new regime was reached after a currency 
crisis and there was an expectation that such imbalances would be solved and the economy was 
going to be more insulate to external shock. In general, the balance of advantages and disadvantages 
of each exchange rate regime can be translated into Robert Mundell´s criteria for an Optimum 
Currency Area on the discussion of the convenience of tying local currencies versus letting them 
float. As the degree of economic integration with the rest of the world increases, so do the 
advantages of fixed exchange rates, whereas advantages of flexible exchange rates tend to fall. This 
outcome is associated to the existence of larger potential gains due to lower transaction costs and 
currency risks; higher inflationary credibility and a heavier weight played by a nominal anchor 
(hard pegs) to control prices.  
 
One crucial goal of this paper is to understand on empirical and theoretical grounds what drives the 
Brazilian exchange rate once the economy switched to a new exchange rate regime. In order to do 
this the empirical analysis examine the behavior of exchange rate, interest rate (domestic and 
foreign) and country risk.   
 
The empirical findings suggest that one can argue in favor of a certain degree of endogeneity of the 
exchange rate in Brazil under floating. Other than this, the flexible exchange rate system have not 
been able to insulate the economy in the same patterns predicted by the literature due to its own 
specificities (managed floating with the use of international reserves and domestic interest rates set 
according to inflation target) and to externally determined by variables such as the country risk. 
With respect to foreign (US) interest rates, the results have not shown a close relationship for 
domestic and foreign interest rates during the floating period.  
 
We started with a brief review of some stylized facts and insights on flexible exchange rates on the 
next section and then we examine a simplified model for exchange rate with monetary 
fundamentals, including interest rates and risk-premium. The idea of the model is to provide some 
intuition on how exchange rates behave in the short and long run, and see how it is linked to country 
risk, and domestic and foreign interest rates since these variables seems to be of crucial relevance to 
understand recent Brazilian experience under floating. Last but not least, the paper aims to examine 
the properties and behavior over time of the exchange rate, interest rates (domestic and foreign) and 
country risk time series for Brazil, using econometric techniques (variance decomposition, Granger 
causality, cointegration tests, error correction models, and GARCH model to estimate the exchange 
rate volatility) to better understand possible (short and long run) relationships among these 
variables. A final issue is to examine if and how the exchange rate can be affected by some liquidity 
measure. If there is, in fact, evidence of the exchange rate endogeneity, international liquidity 
becomes an important instrument to defend the exchange rate parity from external shocks, avoiding 
that speculative positions move this parity to undesired inflationary level according to the inflation 
targeting system.  
 
I - Flexible Exchange Rate Regimes: Insights and Stylized Facts  
 
The main idea of this section of the paper is to highlight some stylized facts associated to flexible 
exchange rate regimes in order to provide some theoretical and empirical subsidies to discuss the 
specificities of the Brazilian experience since early months of 1999 up to this moment.    3 
 
First of all, it is fair to say that there is no clear answer to the question of whether or not floating 
exchange rates is preferred to fixed rates in a world where high financial integration is a rule rather 
than an exception.
1 One of the theoretical advantages of a flexible exchange rate system is the 
degree of monetary independence and so how to protect the economy against external shocks. 
Flexible exchange rates have advantages over fixed rates in terms of higher monetary policy 
independence (classical argument of rules versus discretion) and for allowing a smooth adjustment 
to real shocks even in the presence of price rigidity (Frankel 1999). 
 
One of the arguments suggested by the literature on flexible exchange rates is that under floating it 
is more likely that interest rate can draw apart from international interest rates, minimizing cyclical 
effects that are externally guided. If that is the case, one should observe countries under floating to 
face lower sensibility of domestic interest rate to international interest rate.
2 
 
We can now briefly describe which are the main stylized facts associated to the adoption of flexible 
exchange rates. First, developed countries have experienced higher exchange rate volatility during 
the post-73 when compared to the Bretton-Woods era. Developing countries have shown limited 
exchange rate flexibility and significant balance sheet effects and a high pass-through from 
depreciation to inflation.
3 Developing countries have a preference for allowing higher volatility of 
international reserves and interest rates when compared to exchange rate volatility.
4 Most countries 
that are classified as having a floating regime do not allow the exchange rate to fluctuate in practice, 
or at least they impose limits to this fluctuation.
5 Economies with a high proportion of debts 
expressed in external currencies are more likely to face crises episodes when monetary policy may 
be ineffective regardless of the exchange rate regime.
6 The reluctance to fluctuate the exchange rate 
is followed by a process where the adjustment to a capital flow reversal requires a significant 
reduction in economic activity and problems in terms of international credit access. Finally, 
international reserves should be taken into account as an adjustment variable and not only the 
exchange rate and the interest rate since the transition from a more rigid to a more flexible regime is 
usually followed by a change in the adjustment variables from international reserves and interest 
rates to exchange and interest rates.  
 
There are a number of studies examining the performance (real GDP growth and inflation) of 
exchange regimes with three different answers. The results from Reinhart and Rogoff (2002) 
                                                 
1 There is a large literature on the advantages and disadvantages of fixed, flexible and intermediate exchange rate 
regimes, all of them point out to issues like the degree of monetary policy integration, insulation properties when facing 
real or nominal shocks, incentives for trade and investment, among other issues. In general we can say that there are 
different approaches dealing with the dilemma of fixing or increasing flexibility of the exchange rate for developing 
countries. One of them suggests that pegging the exchange rate is a mistake and countries should increase flexibility 
(Obstfeld and Rogoff 1995; and Larrain e Velasco 2001). Another one argues that increasing flexibility and moving 
towards intermediate regimes will end up having new problems associated to a loss of credibility. The third one, which 
dominates the end of the 1990s, is based on what is called the corner hypothesis states that countries should move to a 
fix or a flexible regime.  See Fischer (2001) and Frankel (2003) for further details.  
2 See the empirical results of this paper where we found evidence that the foreign interest rate (Effective Federal Funds) 
is not cointegrated with the domestic interest rate (Swap360), which can be, at least in part, explained by a strong 
external (U.S.) anti-cyclical monetary policy during the past few years.  
3 The use of exchange rate flexibility to minimize external shocks depends on the degree of capital market integration 
and the quality (less volatile capital flows) of external financing. See Goldfajn and Olivares (2001). 
4 See figure 7 for further details on foreign liquidity indicators in Brazil. 
5 For more details regarding the De Jure Classification and De Facto Classification, see Ghosh et all (2002), Levy-
Yeyati and Sturzenegger (2001), Goldfajn and Olivares (2001) among others.  
6 A more expansionist monetary policy during financial crises is frequently an additional source pressuring for further 
devaluation, worsening the balance sheet effect faced by indebted firms.    4 
suggests that intermediate regimes have better performance, while for Ghosh et all (2002) it is 
associated with fixed regime, and flexible (intermediate) regimes for Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger 
(2002) when using their own (IMF) classification.  According to Ghosh et. all. (2002) nominal 
exchange rate volatility is higher under flexible rates but it decreases for a longer time horizon, and 
intermediate regimes have lower volatility regardless of the span of data. The better inflationary 
performance for fixed regimes seems to be associated with more restrictive monetary policy (lower 
money growth rates).
7 Empirical findings from Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger (2002) have shown 
that the volatility of domestic product decreases with the degree of flexibility of the exchange rate, 
especially for developing countries. Intermediate regimes have a better growth performance when 
using the IMF (De Jure) classification, and flexible regimes perform better for the De Facto 
classification.  
 
Once we have concluded this section describing the most important stylized facts linked to the 
implementation of flexible exchange rate regimes one insight that can be draw is that flexible 
exchange rate regimes more frequently than not seems to be an inevitable outcome for developing 
countries facing international financial crises and speculative attacks. Together with the new 
exchange rate regime countries start to face concerns related to possible inflationary bias of the new 
regime, impact on economic growth and how to manage monetary and fiscal instruments in an 
economic environment of flexible rates and a new nominal anchor. Since early months of 1999 
Brazil has chosen a managed float regime with inflation targeting, where understanding some key 
macroeconomic variables (domestic and foreign interest rate, exchange rate and country risk) of this 
scenario is our goal up to the end of the paper.   
  
 
II – A Simplified Model of Exchange Rate Dynamics 
 
The goal of this section is to present a simplified model of exchange rate dynamics to shed light to 
the recent Brazilian experience under floating. Our proposal is to analyze and have a better 
understanding on how exchange rate, interest rate and country risk are related.  First of all, we have 
following assumptions: 
i) Purchase Power Parity (PPP) is valid only in the lung run, when prices are flexible but it can 
deviate in the short run, when good prices are sticky. In natural log we have that:  








                                                
where  is the nominal exchange rate,  and  are domestic and foreign price index, 
respectively.  
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ii) Equilibrium in the monetary market: 
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where   and   are domestic and foreign incomes, and r  and  are domestic and foreign 
interest rates,  and  are domestic and foreign monetary supply, respectively. If φ = φ* and λ 
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iii) Domestic and foreign assets are not perfect substitutes and country risk must be taking into 
consideration:  
 
7 More restrictive monetary policy for fixed regimes does not translate into more fiscal caution since countries under 
fixed regimes have experienced higher fiscal imbalances.    5 
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where i and  are domestic and external real interest rate, respectively, PR t
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invest in domestic assets, and it is variant in time. This Risk is assumed to be a function of domestic 
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where   is the expected variation of the exchange rate in time t+1. 
e
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In this case, an increase in the risk premium results in a higher interest rate differential or an 
expected appreciation of the exchange rate, the investors reallocate their portfolio in favor of 
domestic assets.  
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 From equation (3) and the PPP condition we have the following equation for the exchange rate: 
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Using rational expectation we end up with the follow specification: 
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where Ωt is a information set and λ / (1 + λ) is a discount factor. 
 
Equation (9) can be easily incorporated with the rational speculative bubble hypothesis. In this case, 
to simplified, consider E(zt+1) as a linear combination of the exogenous variables of the fundamental 
equation of exchange rate as in (8): 
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It can be rearranged in the following way:  
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We also know that:  
sE s b tt t = [| ] Ω                                                                                         (12) 
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   6 
Note that the equation (12) is formally the rational expectation solution of the equilibrium model.  
Therefore, when bt ≠ 0 the exchange rate path systematically deviate from this solution, which 
depends on information of current and future values of the exchange rate determinants. 
 
The general solution of this homogeneous equation is given by: 
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The divergent path, does not depend on E[st|Ωt], is the rational speculative bubble. Once there are 
infinitive solutions to (14), there are as many possible divergent paths for the exchange rate
8.  
 
In the short run, the exchange rate can deviate from its long run equilibrium level and the 
convergence to the new long-term equilibrium depends on the speed of adjustment (θ): 
∆∆ ss s p tk
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From equation (4) and (16): 
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In this case, the gap between the exchange rate and its long-term equilibrium is proportional to the 
interest rate differential and the risk premium.  
 
One can interpret the model in terms of anticipated and non-anticipated changes. The first 
component is specified as: 
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where the anticipated variation of the exchange rate is the actualized sum of the anticipated 
fundamental variables or its linear combination. 
 
On the other hand, the non-anticipated changes can be represented by:   
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where the term in brackets is the effect of changes in expectation on the same fundamental variables 
or its linear combination, caused by information that was not available in t, but only in t+1.  
 
One can represent the exchange rate dynamics of this model (See figure 1) in such a way to draw 
some insights on the recent Brazilian exchange rate experience.  The formal representation of 
Figure 1 suggests the existence of a long run exchange rate, which is not necessarily constant over 
time.  
 
Exchange rate movements in Brazil seems to indicate that in each and every moment when there is 
a currency (financial) crises, the nominal exchange rate shifts to new level and most of the time it 
does not go back to its old level. At the same time, after the exchange rate overshoots, future path 
seems to be characterized by higher volatility and to accommodate in a different level. Once the 
 
8 Dornbusch (1976) in his seminal paper describes the exchange rate overshooting as the short run exchange rate 
deviation from its long run level                                                                     ss pp tL P tL P tt =− − (/ ) ( ) 1 λα  7 
shock has been fully accommodated, the exchange rate parity can move from its initial equilibrium 
(A) to A´, temporarily deviating from the long run equilibrium, but the asset market represented by 
the AM curve is still at its short run equilibrium. Another equilibrium is taking place when the asset 
market adjusts to the new exchange rate parity and the short run equilibrium (point B) seems also to 
be a long run equilibrium point. It is important to consider that what really drives the nominal 
exchange rate to an overshooting situation and to a new equilibrium is the same mechanism, which 
is guided by expectations formed in the asset market (AM). Asset market should be understood 
considering the interactions of financial and monetary markets, or in other words, looking at 
economic agents allocation choices. The asset market equilibrium is weak and temporary under 
floating regime, especially under high capital mobility.
9 More than a simple equilibrium in the 
monetary market, as suggested by monetary models of exchange rate determination, here we have a 
problem of asset allocation and an approximation of the portfolio approach but under high country 
risk and capital mobility as revealed by the Brazilian experience.   
 
Figure 1. Brazilian Exchange Rate Dynamics 
t s ˆ
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III – Exchange Rate Dynamics in Brazil 
 
The present section of the paper is divided into two parts. One deals with long run issues examining 
the statistical properties over time for each time series, including the cointegration analysis. The 
second one focuses on short run issues like volatility and the behavior under floating rates, using 
statistical instruments and econometric techniques such as variance decomposition analysis, 
Granger causality tests, among others. What we are really searching is to answer two important 
questions. Firstly, did the new floating regime change the mean of the effective exchange rate? And, 
secondly, what explain the exchange rate volatility?  
 
 
                                                 
9 The capital account liberalization in Brazil during the 1990s was a process where capital mobility has increased and 
we can consider the economy as facing a scenario of high capital mobility. (see Veríssimo and Holland, 2004).    8 
III.1 – Exchange Rate in Brazil: Long-Run Behavior  
 
According to Figure 2, we can identify two important features of the real effective exchange rate in 
Brazil, from 1980 to 2004, using monthly data. Firstly, there is an evident change on the mean of 
the series right after the implementation of the floating regime (beginning of 1999) when deflating 
the series by the National Consumer Price Index (INPC), where with the Wholesale Price Index 
(IPA) the series seems to move back towards its 1980s level. Analyzing the period of 1980-1994 as 
a benchmark in a historical perspective, the exchange rate devaluated more the 50% when using the 
INPC and only 19% when considering the IPA (table 1). Secondly, there is a strong change in the 
monthly variance of the exchange rate, from a historical mean of 3.5% (IPA) and 3.99% (INPC) 
from 1980 to 1998, to 5.6% (IPA) and 10.8% (INPC) from 1999 to 2004.  
 
On the other hand, analyzing the relationship between exchange rate and wages, according to table 
1, we can verify the fact that there is a downward movement from 1980s to 1998 and an upward 
movement since 1999 that was not able to bring such variables to the same level prior to the Real 
Plan (1994), and recently it is somewhat around 30% below its historical level.  
 
Most studies on long run exchange rates in Brazil using different samples and methods more 
frequently than not ends up with a conclusion that it is difficult  to find empirical evidence 
supporting the idea that there is a long run equilibrium exchange rate. Therefore, there is no 
empirical support for the Purchasing Power Parity hypothesis.
10 According to Froot and Rogoff 
(1995), if the real exchange rate is not a stationary process one can suggest that the nominal 
exchange rate follows domestic and foreign inflation differential,  and the Brazilian evidence 




One important question to be asked is if the exchange rate follows a random walk or if it is a 
stationary process. Based on the results estimated for monthly data, the real effective exchange rate 
is not stationary using Phillips-Perron (P-P) Unit Root Tests
12. As a preliminary insight we can say 
that there is no evidence that changes in nominal exchange rate has followed domestic and foreign 
inflation differential regardless of the price index used. The real effective exchange rate devaluation 
has been accompanied by a reversal in the trade balance from a deficit in 1998 (US$6,4 billions) to 
a surplus in 2003 (more than US$25 bi billions), which can be considered as an empirical evidence 
that changing the exchange rate regime has also implied in changes in the exchange rate level. The 
empirical results from table 2 (P-P test) suggest that all series in first difference are stationary. To 
summarize, we can say that most of the original series are integrated of order one, i.e., I(1).  
 
Examining the Brazilian experience, it is easy to observe that there is a strong regime change when 
looking at the mean and the variance, especially after 1999 when the economy faces the new 
floating (managed) exchange rate regime. It is important to highlight that the strength of this change 
depends on the deflator used. There is a clear change in relative prices in favor of the wholesale 
price index (IPA) and the real effective exchange rate deflated by the IPA is closer to its historical 
level even when we have the new exchange regime. The same does not happen when we consider 
the INPC and real effective exchange rate has shifted to a higher (more devaluated) level.  
 
                                                 
10 See Kannebly Junior (2003) and Holland & Valls (1999).  
11 Unit root tests, either the Phillips-Perron or the Augmented Dickey-Fuller do not reject the null hypothesis of a unit 
root for the effective and real exchange rates in levels but it does for the series in first difference.  
12 Augmented Dickey-Fuller Test was not used because it reveals a tendency to accept the null hypothesis of a unit root 
in time series with structural break.    9 














Source: IPEA (2004) 
Notes: REERinpcX = Real and Effective Exchange Rate, using INPC and weighted by total exports;  
REERipaX = Real and Effective Exchange Rate, using IPA and weighted by total exports;  
REERinpcXm = Real and Effective Exchange Rate, using INPC and weighted by exports of manufactured goods. 
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Source: IPEA (2004). 
Note:  Variability measured by first difference of REERipaX (Real and Effective Exchange Rate, using IPA and 
weighted by total exports). 
 
Table 1. Indexes Devaluation of Exchange Rate (1980-2004) 
 REERinpcX  REERipaX  REERinpcXm REERipaXm ERw  EREw 
1980-1998 100  100  100  100  100  100 
1999-2004 156  119  142  128  71  70 
Notes: REERinpcX = Real and Effective Exchange Rate, using INPC and weighted by total exports;  
REERipaX = Real and Effective Exchange Rate, using IPA and weighted by total exports;  
REERinpcXm = Real and Effective Exchange Rate, using INPC and weighted by exports of manufactured goods; 
ERw = Nominal Exchange Rate-Wages; and EREw = Effective Exchange Rate-Wages. 
 
The next step is to pursue an econometric investigation on the dynamics of the exchange rate since 
the floating regime using daily data, from the 4
th of January 1999 to the 16
th of May 2004. The idea 
is to estimate the equation for the exchange rate as a function of the country risk and domestic and 
foreign interest rates. Based on the analysis of the time series from figures 4 and 5, one can observe 
that domestic interest rate (swap360), exchange rate and country risk exhibit long term co-
movements, but the same does not apply for the US interest rate (Federal Fund) with respect to the 
other variables. In order to address this issue in deeper and more rigorous details we developed 
empirical tests using a VAR (Vector Autoregressive) methodology.   10 
First of all, table 3 describes the unit root test results for all daily time series used in the model. As 
we can see it is difficult to reject the null hypothesis that they do not have a unit root. When they are 
considered in first difference they are stationaries.  
 
Table 3 - Unit Root Tests for Exchange Rate in level and in first difference 
                 Phillips-Perron Test (August 1999 May 2004) 
Critical Values   
Variables  Lags Bandwidth* 
 
PP Test  1% 5%   
ER 3  1  -1.08  -3.44  -2.86   
SWAP360 1  5  -2,35  -3.44  -2.86   
EMBI+ 4  4  -0.98  -2.57  -1.94   
FFUS 2  82  -2.41  3.96  -3.94   
DER 0  7  -27.74  -2.57  -1.94   
DSWAP360 0  2  -32.8  -3.43 -2.86   
DEMBI+ 0  10  -26.07  -2.57 -1.94   
DFFUS 0 102    -39.42  -2.57  -1.94   
             Note: Mackinnon (1996) one-side p-value; Null Hypothesis: If the variable has a unit root. 
       * Bandwidth: Newey-West using Bartlett Kernel 
 
In order to choose the order of each one of our systems we estimate a VAR for four variables 
(SWAP360, FFUS, ER and EMBI+), including dummy variables when they are significant and 
necessary to improve our model specification in terms of obtaining better results for Gaussian 
errors. Table 3 reports the results of the Schwarz (SBC) and Hannan-Quinn (H-Q) tests for system 
reduction. Whichever lag (order) maximizes the SBC or the H-Q for each country was considered 
the order of our VAR. The selected system order is three according to the Schwarz criteria. Overall, 
we can say that we have robust results for our models in terms of well-behaved errors, which is well 
known to be an important result when testing for cointegration.   
 
After estimating the VAR, the hypothesis that there are cointegrating vectors in the system was 
analyzed, following Johansen (1988) and Johansen & Juselius (1990) procedures. The evidence 
from table 4 suggests that one can not reject the hypothesis that there is one cointegrating vector. 
For this reason, after testing for vector stationarity, we included an error correction mechanism 
(ECM) in the exchange rate equation. The Johansen procedure is weak when Gaussian errors are 
not accepted and therefore we introduced dummy variables in some VAR specifications.
13   
 
Table 3. VAR I(1) – Information Criteria  
Model             log-likelihood          P  (# of Parameters)  SC  HQ     AIC 
VAR(5)  -2834.3985        84  6.0119       5.7639       5.6123 
VAR(4)  -2885.2919        68  6.0029       5.8021       5.6794 
VAR(3)  -2927.9202        52  5.9780       5.8244       5.7306 
VAR(2)  -2994.8898        36  5.9999       5.8936       5.8286 
VAR (1)  -3090.4863        20  6.0768       6.0178       5.9817 
 
Table 4. Cointegration Statisitics 
Rank  Trace test [ Prob]   Max test [ Prob]   Trace test (T-nm)    Max test (T-nm) 
   0       57.38 [0.004]**      36.40 [0.002]**      56.72 [0.005]**        35.98 [0.002]** 
   1       20.98 [0.370]          13.79 [0.397]          20.73 [0.385]            13.63 [0.410]   
   2         7.19 [0.563]            6.79 [0.522]            7.10 [0.572]              6.71 [0.532]   
   3         0.39 [0.531]            0.39 [0.531]            0.39 [0.533]              0.39 [0.533]   
Notes: ** denotes significance at 1%; T-nm = adjusted for degrees of freedom   
                                                 
13 Scaled residuals of the equations for each variable and cointegrating vectors are presented in 
figure 4.  
   11 
Figure 4 – Cointegration Analysis – Residuals and Cointegration Relations 
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The next step of our empirical work was to estimate the exchange rate equation as a function of 
domestic market interest rate (SWAP360), foreign interest rate (FFUS) and country risk (EMBI+). 
Regressing the first difference of the nominal exchange rate (DER) by OLS (Ordinary Least 
Square) and using daily data from January 1999 to May 2004 and adding the cointegrating vector, 
we have the following equation (t-values in parentheses): 
 
1040 n 8 . 1 DW 18 . 0 R
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− + − + − = −
          (19) 
 
The econometric interpretation suggests that changes in the exchange rate are explained by 
domestic rate and country risk, but there is no evidence that US interest rate plays an important role 
to explain movements in the nominal exchange rate for Brazil during the period analyzed.  
 
 
III.2 – Short-run Exchange Rate Volatility and Interest Rate 
 
There are some important questions to be answered in this section. First, is there any evidence of 
“excessive” volatility in the Brazilian exchange rate market? Second, has volatility increased since 
the adoption of the floating regime in 1999?  
   12 
In general, the exchange rate time series are not stationary, showing conditional autoregressive 
heteroskedasticity, the errors have no normal distribution, and are asymmetric.
14 One can suggests 
that the level of exchange rate causes the conditional variance, and based on the Brazilian 
experience, the variance can change the mean. It is possible to find support for the idea of volatility 
clustering, that is, periods of high volatility are followed by periods with the same variance 
magnitude and vice-versa for low volatility and variance. Engle (1982) implemented tests for an 
ARCH (Autoregressive Conditional Heteroskedasticity) process, encouraged by the evidence that 
the variance of current residuals could be related to its past level squared or the square of lagged 
residuals
15. Since this pioneer work, a family of conditional heteroskedasticity tests has been 
developed, like the Generalized ARCH, known as GARCH(p,q). It allows for both autoregressive 
and moving average components in the heteroskedastic variance
16. In this case, the conditional 
variance of the errors of the stochastic process {yt} consists in an ARMA (autoregressive moving 
average) process.  
 
According to Bollerslev (1986;1990), a GARGH(p,q) can be defined as: 










iht-i                                                   (20)                   









βj < 1                                                                    (21)                                 
 
When the sum of the αi and βj parameters is equal to one (1) we have an Integrated GARCH 
Model, that is, IGARCH(p, q). Here one can easily obtain a more simplified model such as a 
GARCH(1,1), when the conditional variance shows the following definition: 
ht = αo + α1ε t−1
2
+ β1ht-1                                                                                         (22)                                    
 
The prior section of this paper has shown that there was a significant change in the variance of the 
exchange rate, considering either the nominal or the real effective concept. According to figures 5a 
and 5b, we can observe daily and monthly volatility of nominal and real effective exchange rate 
using a GARCH (1,1) estimation procedure.  From a historical perspective, and until the December 
1998, taking a look at figure 7a, one can relate the volatility picks with the exchange rate events 
associated with policymakers intervention much more than the changes in market perception of the 
macroeconomic situation. During this period such events are associated to maxi devaluations and 
the return of high inflation rates after heterodox stabilization plans have failed during the 1980s and 
early 1990s. Only after the floating regime in 1999, one can relate high volatility with changes in 
how the market is evaluating the economy. 
 
Figure 5b represents daily volatility during the floating regime and we can see that there are three 
different moments of volatility within this period. First, there is a moment of quiescence during the 
first two years of the new floating regime; secondly, from mid of 2001 to the beginning 2003 the 
Brazilian exchange rate market experienced higher volatilities; and finally, from May of 2003 to 
                                                 
14 See Engle (1982) in his empirical analysis on mean and variance relationship for British Inflation. 
15 The ARCH model is clearly non-linear in terms of the variance, but one can prove that this model is similar to a 
linear process such as ARMA, using squared of variables.  
16 The GARCH model is estimated by maximum likelihood and there is an assumption that the errors are conditionally 
and normally distributed. If the variance assumes a linear form, the likelihood function must be estimated by iterative 
methods.   13 
May of 2004 the Brazilian exchange market apparently forgot what is the main characteristic of a 
floating rate regime, which is, its ability to float. One more time, the exchange rate almost did not 
float and this quiescence was abruptly interrupted by a new exchange rate crisis guided by an 
anticipation of the changes in US interest rate. It is worth to highlight this episode since it is the first 
time in recent period that US interest rate has resulted in changes in the domestic exchange rate, 
which is corroborated by our empirical findings.  
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Figure 5b. Daily Volatility (1999-2004) 
 
Figures 6a and 6b illustrate the relationship (or lack of) between domestic interest rate and US 
interest rate. This phenomenon takes place not because of the insulation properties of the floating 
regime but due to a specific moment in US monetary policy where interest rates have been 
extremely low for the past few years. In fact, we have other channels other then foreign interest 
rates as international shock transmission, such as the country risk and its association to the 
probability of default and the domestic interest rate
17. A closer behavior over time for the 
exchange rate, country risk and domestic interest rate is illustrated by Figure 7a for the Brazilian 
economy under floating exchange rates.
18    
 
Figure 6. Interest Rate (1999-2004) 










































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Source: Central Bank of Brazil (2004) and CETIP (2004). 
                                                 
17 See Holland & Vieira (2003) for the relationship among interest rate, country risk and probability of default in Brazil 
in recent period. 
18 We are using the SWAP360 rate as domestic interest rate because it is the rate used by the exchange rate market to 
make financial calculus and to take decisions. In the figure 6a one can see the other one, the Over-Selic rate, used in 
open market and used to the Monetary Authorities to announce the target of the interest rate.    14 




























































































































































































































































































Figure 7b. Brazil and Emerging Market: EMBI+  
Source: Central Bank of Brazil (2004), CETIP(2004) and J.P.Morgan(2004). 
 
Table 5 describes some basic statistics for five time series (country risk, exchange rate, market 
interest rate, government interest rate, and foreign interest rate). At a first look we can say that 
the exchange rate changes less than the country risk but it is closer to the domestic (market) 
interest rate. It is worth noting that the exchange rate assumed values ranging from 1.72 to 3.95 
real per dollar in a relative short period of time. At the same time, the country risk, measured by 
the J.P.Morgan EMBI+ has shifted from 410 to 2436 points, and the interest rate (SWAP360) 
changed from an annual rate of 14.98% to 32.69%. Setting aside the numbers and looking at the 
general picture, it is fair to saw that the floating regime in Brazil relies on a weak combination of 
significant variability and vulnerabilities, where its implementation have not been followed by 
periods where other external financial variables are more accommodative, besides the trade 
balance, according to figure 8.
19 One can see a strong co-movement between trade balance and 
real and effective exchange rate since the floating regime in 1999. We used the Hodrick-Prescott 
filter as a smoothing method that is widely used among macroeconomists to obtain a smooth 
estimate of the long-term trend component of a series
20.  
 













 Mean   921   2.51   21.65   19.07   3.32 
 Median   800   2.46   20.97   18.69   2.03 
 Maximum   2436   3.95   32.69   26.32   7.03 
 Minimum   410   1.72   14.98   14.99   0.86 
 Standard Deviation   378   0.58   4.35   3.03   2.15 
 Variation Coefficient  41 23  20  16  66 
Notes: EMBI+ = JPMorgan Country Risk; ER = Nominal Exchange Rate: SWAP 360 = Brazilian Interest Rate in 
Swap Market to 360 days; SELIC = Brazilian Interest Rate in Open Market; FFUS = US Effective Federal Fund. 
                                                 
)
19 It should be reminded that since 2001 the Brazilian exchange rate have played an important role in improving the 
trade balance when it started to show surplus outcomes.  
20 Hodrick and Prescott to analyze postwar U.S. business cycles used this method for the first time.  Technically, the 
Hodrick-Prescott (HP) filter is a two-sided linear filter that computes the smoothed series (s) of (y) by minimizing 
the variance of (y) around (s), subject to a penalty that constrains the second difference of (s). In other words, the HP 
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t λ t λ
The penalty parameter controls the smoothness of the series 
(s ). The larger the , the smoother the (s ). As  , ( ) approaches a linear trend.  ∞ → t s  15 
  
Figure 8. Brazil: Trade balance and Real and Effective Exchange Rate –  
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Source: Central Bank of Brazil (2004) and IPEA (2004). 
Note: TBhp = Trade Balance smoothed by HP filter; REERhp = Real and Effective Exchange Rate 
using IPA and weighted by total exports and smoothed by HP filter. 
 
 
The Granger causality tests reported on table 7 for two lags and using all variables in first difference 
suggests the existence of bi-causality for domestic interest rate (swap360) and exchange rate, and 
for country risk (EMBI+) and exchange rate, and the results are robust to changes in the number of 
lags. There is no causality (Granger) for foreign interest rate (Federal Funds) and exchange rate, and 
for foreign and domestic (swap360) interest rates.
21 Other than this, causality was found from 
country risk to domestic interest rate for any lags used, but the other way round indicates mixed 
evidence for causality since it can be found for five, four (only at 10%), three and two lags, but no 
causality for one lag. Finally, there is no causality for country risk (EMBI+) and foreign interest 
rates (Federal Funds) for any number of lags.  
 
 
Table 6. VAR I(0) – Information Criteria  
Model             log-likelihood          P  (# of Parameters)  SC  HQ     AIC 
VAR (5)  -2851.1577        84  6.0441       5.7961       5.6445 
VAR (4)  -2853.6774        68  5.9421       5.7413       5.6186 
VAR (3)  -2908.3030        52  5.9402       5.7867       5.6929 
VAR (2)  -2956.6094        36  5.9263       5.8200       5.7550 








                                                 
21 One possible explanation for this result can be associated to the fact that U.S. monetary policy assumed a specific 
downward trend since the beginning of 2001, and the domestic (Brazil) monetary policy experimented significant 
upward and downward movements during this period.  
   16 
 
Table 7. Granger Causality Test               Sample: 4/01/1999 4/16/2004  Lags: 2 
 
 Null Hypothesis:  Obs  F-Statistic  Probability 
  DFFUS does not Granger Cause DEMBI  1164   0.41218   0.66230 
  DEMBI does not Granger Cause DFFUS   0.24650   0.78158 
  DSWAP does not Granger Cause DEMBI ***  1168   4.83920   0.00807 
  DEMBI does not Granger Cause DSWAP ***   17.5823   3.0E-08 
  DTC does not Granger Cause DEMBI ***  1168   5.78699   0.00316 
  DEMBI does not Granger Cause DTC ***   41.1974   0.00000 
  DSWAP does not Granger Cause DFFUS  1164   1.11018   0.32985 
  DFFUS does not Granger Cause DSWAP   0.16884   0.84467 
  DTC does not Granger Cause DFFUS  1164   1.20675   0.29954 
  DFFUS does not Granger Cause DTC   0.25273   0.77672 
  DTC does not Granger Cause DSWAP  1168   1.04864   0.35074 
  DSWAP does not Granger Cause DTC ***   17.0352   5.1E-08 
*, ** and *** denotes significance level at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively  
 
 
Table 8 - Variance Decomposition  
 
Variance Decomposition of DEMBI 
                  Period  S.E.  DEMBI  DFFUS  DSWAP  DTC 
 1   33.00718   100.0000   0.000000   0.000000   0.000000 
 5   34.66954   98.47078   0.082736   0.915516   0.530964 
 10   34.67069   98.46593   0.082750   0.917500   0.533823 
Variance Decomposition of DFFUS: 
                  Period  S.E.  DEMBI  DFFUS  DSWAP  DTC 
 1   0.127308   0.011291   99.98871   0.000000   0.000000 
 5   0.129168   0.071049   99.67113   0.182590   0.075230 
 10   0.129171   0.072682   99.66890   0.183014   0.075403 
Variance Decomposition of DSWAP: 
                  Period  S.E.  DEMBI  DFFUS  DSWAP  DTC 
 1   0.459480   0.008391   0.004910   99.98670   0.000000 
 5   0.468521   2.911060   0.026787   96.87470   0.187456 
 10   0.468534   2.912162   0.026789   96.87134   0.189704 
Variance Decomposition of DTC: 
                  Period  S.E.  DEMBI  DFFUS  DSWAP  DTC 
 1   0.027784   0.978450   0.061159   14.02423   84.93616 
 5   0.030006   8.599826   0.140245   15.87630   75.38363 
 10   0.030022   8.677238   0.140432   15.87451   75.30782 
Cholesky Ordering: DEMBI DFFUS DSWAP DTC 
 
The variance decomposition results reported in table 8 show that changes in the exchange rate, 
domestic and foreign interest rates do not play an important role in explaining movements in the 
country risk, and the same interpretation is valid for changes in foreign interest rates that can be 
poorly explained by changes in the domestic interest rate, nominal exchange rate and country risk. 
On the other hand there are two interesting results. First, the variance decomposition of the 
domestic market interest rate (swap360) is partially explained by the changes in country risk 
(around 3%), where the variance of the exchange rate seems to be conditioned on the changes in the 
country risk (8,67%) and in the domestic interest rate (15,87%).   17 
IV - EXCHANGE RATE AND FOREIGN LIQUIDITY 
 
We can now analyze the relationship between floating regime and international exchange reserves. 
It is known that, under more rigid exchange rate regimes, foreign exchange reserves should be at a 
level high enough to deal with possible trade or current account deficits. A significant fall on 
international reserves is generally associated to episodes of foreign exchange crises and in this 
situation one can expect a higher probability that countries with more rigid exchange regimes will 
move to a new and more flexible regime. 
 
Let us briefly recall some of the advantages and disadvantages attributed to floating exchange rate 
regimes concerning the international liquidity problem (Mishkin & Savastano, 2000; Calvo, 2000).  
First of all, monetary policy becomes free to target inflation or other macroeconomic goal. Thus, 
monetary policy can deal with investment and output fluctuations, usually associated to external 
shocks. Secondly, exchange rates become a thermometer of the economy’s health, which may 
remain hidden within a hard peg. And thirdly, a floating regime reduces the likelihood of 
underestimation of effective exchange-rate risks. On the other hand, exchange rate instability may 
lead to high currency risks and financial instability, whenever there is partial liabilities (private or 
public) dollarization (as unit of account or as an effective means of payment). Vulnerability with 
respect to currency fluctuations is an additional component of "financial fragility" for emerging 
economies. On the other hand, one must not forget that protracted real adjustments under hard pegs 
may result in more dangerous sources of risks; and some degree of financial development is 
required in order to provide appropriate instruments to manage currency risks. Otherwise, foreign 
exchange markets will face problems of herding behavior and manipulation, which are usually 
associated to higher market volatility. One should expect a more erratic economic fluctuation   
"dirtiness" for emerging economies when compared to advanced countries. This can be explained 
due to a higher dependence on foreign capital flows and frequent liquidity restrictions and sudden 
credit squeezes, and because nominal price volatility of tradable goods may have a positive impact 
on inflation volatility.  
 
Initially, it can be questioned whether or not movements in foreign exchange reserves on a floating 
regime works as if it is an accommodative tool.  A preliminary graphic analysis (figure 8a) seems to 
indicate that there is a strong upward movement in foreign exchange reserves during most of the 
decade, especially in period of quiescence, but a strong downward movement in situations of stress 
usually associated to episodes of external (Asia - 1997 and Russia - 1998) or domestic (Brazil -
1999).   
 
It is interesting to highlight that in the mid of 2000 the international liquidity indicator, measured by 
foreign exchange over imports has steadily increased from 6 to 10 months of imports. At first sight, 
it seems to indicate that the floating regime has been implemented in an environment of liquidity 
cushion suggesting that the Brazilian economy is prepared to face external crisis (figure 9a). But 
looking with caution and in more details we can observe different and concerning situation when 
international exchange reserves are adjusted after considering liabilities associated to them, which 
represents a significant portion of international liquidity. In May 2004, adjusted (to liabilities) 
international reserves are US$24,700 billions instead of US$50,497 billions. Observing the figure 
9b, one can see the same situation where the Adjusted International Liquidity per Imports. 
Summary, if we take a look at the relationship between external debt and exports we can see an 
improvement in Brazilian external liquidity, but it is worth to say that the other international 
liquidity indicator (the ratio of adjusted foreign liquidity to imports) has shown a clear downward 
trend since the new regime. Therefore, it is hard to argue that the liquidity cushion is at an 
appropriated level.  Under such circumstances it is fair to anticipate that the Brazilian exchange rate   18 
market can be targeted of more speculative movements in favor of the US assets markets. The 
remarkable difference up to now is the news suggesting medium term changes in US monetary 
policy.  
 
Figure 9. International Liquidity Indicators 
Figure 9a. International Reserves  /  Imports  
Monthly Data (1990-2004) 
 Figure 9b. External Debt /  Exports and Adjusted 































































The literature on floating exchange rate regimes can be considered somehow skeptical since 
controversies and different empirical outcomes seems to be the rule rather than the exception. 
Floating regimes for developing countries have distinct features since the pass-through from 
devaluation to inflation is a frequent concern and free floating has almost never been adopted in 
these countries where international reserves are still an important variable do manage the exchange 
rate in a world where financial crisis are quite frequent.  
 
The empirical analysis of the Brazilian experience under floating rates has provided some useful 
insights. One of them is that the exchange rate does not seem to be driven by foreign interest rates, 
which could be considered an advantage in terms of setting apart the behavior of the exchange rate 
and possible external shocks. On the other hand, domestic market interest rate (swap360) and 
country risk (EMBI+) play an important role on the exchange rate dynamics during the floating 
period in Brazil. Other than this the empirical results suggests not only a country risk endogeneity 
to domestic interest rate but the exchange rate seems to display a certain degree of endogeneity. 
This can be considered as unexpected empirical evidence since the Brazilian economy did not take 
advantage of a favorable scenario of lower US interest rates and it was necessary to maintain high 
real interest rates to prevent undesirable inflation impacts from exchange rate movements (pass 
through). This phenomenon is clear when we take into account the emphatic co-movement among 
the country risk (or the probability of default), the interest rate and the exchange rate.  
 
After the theoretical and empirical analysis pursued in this paper regarding the exchange rate in 
Brazil under floating rates we can say that there are specificities that should be taken into account in 
order to understand its dynamics in more details. One of this is the straight link of interest rates, 
exchange rate and the degree of indebtedness under a macroeconomic situation where 
macroeconomic policy is guided by managing the exchange rate and targeting the inflation.  
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